Abstract-Multi-dimension bucketization is a typical method to anonymize multiple sensitive attributes. However, the method leads to low data utility when microdata have more sensitive attributes. In addition, the methods do not generalize quasi-identifiers, which make the anonymous data vulnerable to suffer from linked attacks. To address the problems, the paper proposes a SLOMS method. The method vertically partitions the multiple sensitive attributes into several tables and bucketizes each sensitive attribute table to implement l-diversity. At the same time, it generalizes the quasi-identifiers to implement k-anonymity. The paper also proposes a MSB-KACA algorithm to anonymize microdata with multiple sensitive attributes by SLOMS. Experiments show that SLOMS can generate anonymous tables with less suppression ratio and less distortion compared with generalization and MSB.
I. INTRODUCTION
Microdata play an increasingly important role in data analysis and scientific research. However, publishing and sharing microdata will threaten individuals' privacy. Therefore, some anonymity models have been proposed to protect individual's privacy for microdata publish recently. k-anonymity [1] is a simple and effective method to protect privacy in microdata, which requires that each tuple has at least k indistinguishable tuples with respect to quasi-identifier in the released data. But it cannot resist homogeneity attack and background knowledge attack, so some other enhanced anonymity models have been proposed, such as l-diversity [4] and tcloseness [5] .
Several techniques have also been proposed to implement the above anonymity models. Generalization [1] [2] [3] is a typical one to implement anonymity model, whose idea is to replace real value of quasi-identifier with less specific but semantically consistent value. Generalization distorts original data, which is disadvantageous to data mining. Anatomy [6] is also a fine method to anonymize microdata, whose idea is to release all the quasi-identifier and sensitive values directly in two separate tables. However, releasing the QI-values directly may suffer from a higher breach probability than generalization. To overcome these drawbacks, Tao et al. [7] proposed ANGEL, a new anonymization method that is as effective as generalization in privacy protection, which can retain higher data utility. Leela et al. [8] applied Angelization to preserve privacy in re-publication of dynamic microdata after insertions or deletions. Li et al. [9] proposed slicing, which anonymizes microdata by partitioning microdata horizontally and vertically. Neha et al. [10] concluded that slicing preserves data utility better than generalization, in addition, it also prevents membership disclosure.
All of above works focus on microdata with single sensitive attribute. These methods will lead to much low data utility when they are directly used for microdata with multiple sensitive attributes. At present, there is only a few work concentrated on microdata with multiple sensitive attributes. Yang et al. [11] proposed a Multiple Sensitive Bucketization(MSB) approach. But the MSB method is only suitable to deal with microdata with less sensitive attributes, e.g, 2 to 3 sensitive attributes. For microadata with more sensitive attributes, MSB would result in high suppression ratios. For example, table I is an original dataset. We assume that {Gender, ZipCode, Age} are quasi-identifier attributes and {Occupation, Salary, Physician, Disease} are sensitive attributes. We can achieve a 3-diversity table by MSB, seeing table II.  The anonymity table only has one group with tuples {t 5 , t 6 , t 7 } presented in table II, the rest tuples are all suppressed. The suppression ratio is 6/9, which greatly degrades the quality of data publishing. 
II. SLOMS
In this section, we first give an example to illustrate SLOMS, and then introduce some basic notations and definitions in Section A. Section B formalizes SLOMS, and compares it with MSB and generalization, section C discusses how to partition sensitive attributes, and Section D discusses privacy threats that SLOMS can resist.
For example, -identifier attribute table conform to 3-anonymity  and insert 2 columns of sensitive values' group ID, seeing  in table VI. SLOMS publishes the microdata of table III,  table IV Now, let us compare SLOMS with MSB. First, SLOMS vertically partitions sensitive attributes in order to decrease suppression ration as we describe in our examples. Second, by releasing the quasi-identifier values directly, MSB may suffer a higher breach probability than SLOMS. Nevertheless, such probability is always bounded by 1/l, as long as the background knowledge of an adversary is not stronger than the level allowed by the l-diversity model. However, SLOMS generalizes quasiidentifier values gain another breach probability x which is the probability an adversary can sure someone is to be involved in the microdata. The value of x is always less than or equal to 1. The overall breach probability of
Our goal is to sacrifice a little information loss on quasi-identifier attributes for higher privacy guarantee. If m is 1 and k is 1, SLOMS is actually gracefully degraded into MSB, just one sensitive attribute table needed. We can say that SLOMS is a superset of MSB. When d is small, there is no denying that MSB has good publishing data with better data utility. We put emphasis on dataset which have a large number of sensitive attributes.
To compare SLOMS with generalization, we first formalize generalization obeying the same anonymization principle which is l-diversity.
Definition 5 (l-diversity generalization). Let G 1 ,G 2 ,……,G m be partitions of T, we say that T is a ldiversity generalization if for all i = 1…m, the quasiidentifier attributes in G i are generalized into the same value with the sensitive attributes satisfying Multiple sensitive attributes l-diversity.
If T is generalized to satisfy multiple sensitive attributes l-diversity, some tuples need to be suppressed for satisfying l-diversity. For example, table I obeying the 3-diversity generalization, there are only three tuples reserved, namely t 5 , t 6 , t 7 , others are all suppressed. The values of quasi-identifier attributes {t 5 , t 6 , t 7 } are all generalized into {*, *****, 29-35}. Suppression ratio and information loss will increase greatly when we anonymize multiple sensitive attributes dataset using generalization. Intuitively, generalization is not suitable for multiple sensitive attributes dataset. We would like to emphasize that our goal is not to deny generalization.There is no doubt that generalization is an important technique in single sensitive attributes dataset and it has been received much attention in lots of literatures. Instead, our intention is to combine generalization with Slicing to maximize data utility of anonymous data for handling multiple sensitive attributes dataset.
C. Sensitive Attributes Partition
Firstly, SLOMS should partition sensitive attributes into m parts. SLOMS partitions sensitive attributes according to the principle that highly correlated sensitive attributes are in the same table, because grouping highly correlated sensitive attributes preserves the correlations among those sensitive attributes. Therefore, we first compute the correlations between pairs of sensitive attributes and then cluster attributes based on their correlations.
Two widely used measures of correlations are Pearson correlation coefficient [13] and mean-square contingency coefficient [13] . We adopt the mean-square contingency coefficient because most of our sensitive attributes are categorical and the mean-square contingency coefficient is a chi-square measure of correlation between two categorical attributes. Given two attributes s 1 and s 2 with domains {v 11 , v 12 , …, v 1p } and { v 21 , v 22 , …, v 2q }, respectively. p and q are their domain size, respectively. The mean-square contingency coefficient between s 1 and s 2 is defined as (1). If there are some continuous sensitive attributes, we regard them as categorical attributes after being discretized.
After computing the correlations for each pair of sensitive attributes, we use clustering to partition sensitive attributes into tables. Each sensitive attributes in our algorithm is a point in the clustering space. The distance between two attributes in the clustering space is defined as
, which is in interval
For two sensitive attributes, the smaller distance between the corresponding data points, the stronger correlation they are. We use the well-known k-medoid algorithm PAM (Partition Around Medoids) for clustering [14] . PAM begins with k randomly data points as the initial medoids. In each subsequent step, PAM chooses one medoid point and one nonmedoid point and swaps them as long as the cost of clustering decreases. Here, the clustering cost is measured as the sum of the cost of each cluster, which is in turn measured by the sum of the distance from each data point in the cluster to the medoid point of the cluster.
Its time complexity is O(k(m-k)
2 ) which is a highcomputational complexity for large data sets. However, the data points in our clustering space are sensitive attributes, whose number is small.
D. Privacy Preservation
There are three types of privacy disclosure threats of microdata publishing. The first one is membership disclosure, which occurs when adversaries can infer whether one's record is included in the dataset from publishing microdata. The second one is identity disclosure, which occurs when an individual is linked to some records in multiple released datasets. This type of threat was illustrated in [2] , where adversaries can join a public voter registration list and the de-identified patient data of Massachusetts's state employees to determine the medical history of the state's governor. The third one is attribute disclosure, which occurs when new information about some individuals is revealed, i.e., the released data make it possible to infer the attributes value of an individual.
We consider that SLOMS can resist all these privacy disclosure threats. k-anonymity is an excellent model to protect membership disclosure and identity disclosure. We generalize the quasi-identifier attributes to conform the requirement of k-anonymity. For the attribute disclosure, l-diversity is used to prevent sensitive attributes from disclosure. We partition sensitive attributes to buckets, obeying the requirement of ldiversity.
III. EVALUATION OF ANONYMOUS DATA
There are two aspects of information loss, the first one occurs in generalization, the second one occurs in anatomy.
A. Measurement For Generalization
We adapt the distortion [12] to measure the quality of generalization. We make some definitions to explain it.
Definition 6 (Weighted Hierarchical Distance). Let h be the height of a domain hierarchy, and let levels 1, 2, …, h-1, h be the domain levels from the most general to most specific, respectively. When a cell is generalized from level p to level q, where p > q, the weighted hierarchical distance of this generalization is defined as (2). 
Definition 9 (Closet common generalization). All allowable values of an attribute form a hierarchical value tree. Each value is represented as a node in the tree, and a node has a number of child nodes corresponding to its more specific values. t 12 is the closest common generalization of t 1 and t 2 , and its value is defined as (5). Definition 10 (Distance between two tuples). Let t 12 be the closest common generalization of t 1 and t 2 . The distance between t 1 and t 2 is defined as (6). ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) dist g g n dist t t n dist t t = × + ×
The distance is equivalent to the distortions of the generalization and therefore the choice of merger should be those equivalence classes with the smallest distances.
B. Measurement For Anatomy
Now, let us discuss the metrics of sensitive attributes. Definition 12 (Additional information loss [11] ). Let G i be a group in a l-diversity table, b be the number of groups in the l-diversity table, then Additional information loss of one sensitive attribute in group G i can be defined as 
where m is the number of sensitive attributes. Ideally, every tuple in original table should be assigned to one group in anonymity table, however, for the restriction of l-diversity, some tuples cannot belong to any group. These tuples should be suppressed.
Definition 13 (Suppression ratio). Let n s be the number of suppressed tuples, then the suppression ratio is defined as (9) . Intuitively, the smaller SuppRatio, the higher the quality of anonymized data. Obviously, when the Suppression ratio is 0, the quality of anonymized data is optimal, for example table III and table IV. We consider a tuple as a suppressed tuple when it has at least one suppressed value. We use "NA" to replace its group ID. For instance, we have a tuple {M,4200*,[31,35],1,NA}. The first three values stand for generalized quasiidentifier values, the fourth value stands for a group ID, and the fifth value stands for a suppressed sensitive value.
IV. SLOMS ALGORITHM
In this section, we present an efficient MSB-KACA algorithm to achieve SLOMS. Given a dataset T and three parameter m, l and k, the algorithm computes the result The basic idea of MSB method is: (1) assign each tuple to a bucket according to each sensitive attribute values of the tuple, each bucket has the same values on all sensitive attributes, and assign a priority to each bucket according to some policies; (2) randomly choose a tuple in the highest priority bucket; (3) shield all buckets which have the same value with the selected tuple in any dimension ; (4) repeat (2)(3) until a l-diversity group is built.
There are three liner-complexity greedy algorithms to implement MSB [11] , namely, the maximal-bucket first algorithm (MBF), the maximal single-dimension-capacity first algorithm (MSDCF), and the maximal multiple dimension-capacity first algorithm (MMDCF). The differences of these three algorithms are the policies of calculating bucket priority. In MBF, the maximal bucket is chosen as the criterion while MSDCF choose maximal single-dimension capacity and MMDCF choose maximal multi-dimension capacity.
The selection priority of the maximal bucket is defined as (10). The selection priority of the maximal single-dimension capacity is defined as (11). The selection priority of the maximal multi-dimension capacity is defined as (12). For example, Occupation and Salary are chosen as sensitive attributes in table I. In the first place, we make a 2-dimension bucket of {Occupation and Salary}, illustrated in figure 1 . In MMDCF the maximal selection of bucket<clerk, 4000+> is 7 according to formula (12) (there are 3 tuples in 4000+ dimension, 3 tuples in clerk dimension and 1 tuple in buk<clerk, 4000+>, totally is 7), which is the highest priority, then we shield dimension <clerk> and <4000+>. Repeat the procedure, we can get bucket<teacher, 6000+> whose selection is 6 and bucket<cook, 10000+> whose selection is 5. Therefore, {t 1 , t 5 , t 6 } are chosen as a partition conforming to 3-diversity. Figure 1 .
2-dimension bucket of {Occupation and Salary}
The detail of MSB-KACA algorithm is shown in algorithm 1. randomly choose an equivalence class C of size < k; 10.
evaluate the pairwise distance between C and all other equivalence classes;
11. find the equivalence class C' with the smallest distance to C; 12.
generalize the equivalence classes C and C'; 13: end while 14. link generalized table and ST i according to tuple ID to form QIT; 15.end Now we consider the time complexity of MSB-KACA algorithm. The time of partitioning dataset into m+1 tables just need liner time complexity, which is O(n). In bucketization step, which is to partition sensitive attributes tables into buckets, MMDCF is a linercomplexity greedy algorithm with O(n) time complexity. In generalization step, which is to generalize quasiidentifier attributes into equivalence classes, the KACA algorithm runtime is O(nlogn+|E| 2 ) [12] . Therefore, the total time complexity of MSB-KACA algorithm is O(n)
V. EXPERIMENTS

A. Experimental Environment And Data
This section experimentally evaluates the effectiveness of our approach using the Adult Database from the UCI Machine Learning Repository which we can download at http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/census-income/.
We randomly choose 10000 records. The description of Census-Income data is shown in table VII. The experiments are conducted on a PC with CPU 3.0 GHZ and RAM 2GB. All the algorithms are implemented in Java on Windows XP with JDK version 1.6.0_23. Figure 2 (a), 2(b), 2(c) and 2(d) plot the variation of suppression ratio using MSB-KACA,MBF,MSDCF and MMDCF on different l when n is 10000 and d is 3-6. Apparently, MSB-KACA produces significantly lower suppression ratio than other three algorithms in all cases. This is expected, since SLOMS reduces the dimensions of buckets, which makes it easy to form l-diversity group. We can also observe that the suppression ratio grows rapidly with the increasing of parameter l. Because when l is increasing, the demands of diversity in buckets are also growing. It is harder to partition sensitive values, the higher suppression ratio generated. Figure 3 (a) illustrates the variation of additional information loss using MSB-KACA,MBF,MSDCF and MMDCF on different l when n is 10000 and d is 4,which is calculated by formula (8) . Figure 3(b) illustrates the variation of additional information loss on different n when l is 6 and d is 4. We can conclude that all the four algorithms produce low additional information loss. Figure 4 (a) shows the changes of distortion using MSB-KACA and generalization on different |QI| when l is 6, k is 6 and n is 10000, which is calculated by formula(4). Figure 4(b) shows the changes of distortion on different n when l is 6, k is 6, and |QI| is 5. We can conclude that MSB-KACA has low distortion since it does not need to take sensitive attributes diversity into account. Figure 5 (a) shows the cost of computing the publishable table by MSB-KACA,MBF,MSDCF and MMDCF on different n when d is 4 and l is 6. It is obvious that the cost increases as n increases. Since the more tuples need to be anonymized,the longer time consumed to finish the anonymization procedure. Figure  5 (b) investigates the influence of d on execution time when l is 6 and n is 10000. Figure 5(c) investigates the influence of l on execution time when d is 4 and n is 10000. Apparently, MSB-KACA costs over twice time than other three algorithms. To explain this, recall that MSB-KACA combines anatomy and generalization techniques. Generalization costs more time than anatomy. That is why MSB-KACA takes more time.
B. Analysis Of Suppression Ratio
C. Analysis Of Additional Information Loss
D. Analysis Of Distortion
D. Analysis Of Execution Time
We can see that the advantage of our method in quality of anonymous data does not come for free. However, in all test cases our algorithm can finish in less than 1 minute, which is acceptable for data anonymization. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RUTURE WORK
The paper proposes an SLOMS method to anonymize multiple sensitive attributes microdata and analyses the privacy attacks that SLOMS can address. The paper also proposes an MSB-KACA algorithm based on SLOMS method. Experimental results show that the anonymized data by SLOMS have low additional information loss and suppression ratio compared with MSB.
Privacy preservation on multiple sensitive attributes microdata is a challenging work. There are many interesting topics in this area. For example, personalized privacy preservation [15] is an interesting work. In addition, research on efficient algorithms based on generalization and anatomy is also a significant work in the future.
